U.S. Adopts “Separate Deals” Approach After Taiwan Chip Tariff Accord

Washington last tried something similar in the 1986 U.S.–Japan Semiconductor Agreement, when threats of 100 % duties coerced Toshiba and NEC into price floors and local production; today’s playbook is the same but the stakes are larger because chips now anchor everything from AI weapons to electric cars. This episode fits a decades-long drift—from the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff to the 2022 CHIPS Act—toward tying national security directly to industrial location. By insisting on country-by-country bargains, the U.S. is weaponising market access to force on-shore investment, accelerating the fragmentation of what was once a single, scale-driven global supply chain. A century from now the moment may be viewed either as the tipping point that regionalised the semiconductor ecosystem—like oil after the 1973 embargo—or as another short-lived protectionist surge that crumbled once costs and innovation pressures reasserted global integration.