US Opens Section 301 Excess-Capacity Probe Against 16 Economies, China Pushes Back

Washington last wielded Section 301 this aggressively during the 1980s semiconductor and auto battles with Japan (e.g., 1987 chip accord, 1995 threatened 100 % tariffs), episodes that temporarily protected U.S. industries but hastened supply-chain relocation and sowed long-term mistrust. Today’s reprise signals a broader post-COVID trend: major powers sidelining the WTO (founded 1995) and reverting to unilateral leverage once thought buried after the 1930 Smoot-Hawley spiral. By labeling normal export-oriented capacity as “overproduction,” the U.S. is re-framing industrial competition as a trade violation—a tactic that, if copied, could fracture the century-old move toward global production networks. Whether this moment becomes a footnote—like many 301 cases quietly settled—or a hinge that normalizes bloc-based tariff walls will rest on the July deadline and the ability of institutions (or markets) to check election-season protectionism. Either way, it underscores the long arc of incumbent powers using trade law to slow rising competitors, a pattern visible from Britain’s Navigation Acts in the 17th century to the present.