Iran Sets 15-Ship Daily Cap on Hormuz Traffic Under Ceasefire

States weaponising maritime chokepoints is not new—Egypt’s 1956 nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the 1984-88 “Tanker War” in this same waterway both saw traffic fall by 60-90 % and forced outside powers to negotiate or escort. Iran’s move fits a longer arc: declining U.S. naval dominance, the rise of digital payment work-arounds to sanctions, and a world where energy routes can be micro-managed by regional powers for leverage. Whether the cap endures or not, it normalises the idea that a non-hegemonic state can impose tolls and quotas on an international strait—something UNCLOS tried to foreclose in 1982—and that could ripple to Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb, or even Panama over the next century. If accepted, it marks a quiet but profound shift from “freedom of navigation” toward “conditional navigation,” with implications for global energy security and the legal order that has underpinned maritime trade since 1945.